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Key points for policy-makers 
Italian banks are in a precarious situation, burdened by non-performing loans (NPLs) 
that are almost of the same magnitude as their capital and provisions. The gradual 
approach of dealing with NPLs via more provisioning and some sales has yielded little 
results. The political crisis now gives an opening to the authorities to take radical 
steps to put the Italian banking system on a sound footing. 
Policy Recommendations 
 The balance sheets of Italian banks should be cleaned-up. The quickest way to 
achieve this would be to transfer non-performing exposures to an asset-
management vehicle. 
 The losses resulting from the transfer could be covered by capital, obtained via 
soft (conversion of debt instruments into equity) or hard bail-in (loss absorption). 
The hard bail-in of creditors would amount approximately to only €5 billion. 
 The Italian government should clearly explain to its citizens the difference 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ bail-in, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the 
inevitable. Only a hard bail-in leads to a total loss. In a soft bail-in, investors 
participate in the upside from a cleaned-up banking system.  
 Government intervention is needed only to extent that one wants to protect 
some investors from losses for political reasons. 
 The Italian banking sector does not have many foreign creditors. It is not 
necessary to enlist the involvement of the pan-euro-area institutions, such as the 
Single Resolution Fund and the European Stability Mechanism, which could in 
any event only cover part of the losses. 
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he problem is by now well known.1 Italy’s 
banks are drowning in a large pool of non-
performing loans (NPLs), limiting their 
ability to lend to the real economy. The 15 largest 
Italian banks, i.e. those included in the 
transparency exercise conducted by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), had a total non-
performing exposures of €292 billion at the end of 
June 2016. This sum is in the same order of 
magnitude as the regulatory capital and provisions 
of these banks, thereby putting them in a 
precarious situation. In order to make the Italian 
banking sector work again, the banks should be 
liberated from this burden. But, in the absence of 
state aid, this will require some bail-in of creditors. 
We argue in this policy brief that one needs to 
distinguish between two types of bail-in: ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’.   
A ‘hard’ bail-in occurs when the holders of (usually 
subordinated) debt instruments lose everything. 
In a ‘soft’ bail-in the creditors receive a 
participation in the capital at book value. In this 
case the loss could be much lower as it will depend 
on the market-to-book value of the bank 
concerned.   
We find that most of the bail-in required even for 
a transfer of all NPLs away from the banks would 
be of the soft kind. The Italian authorities should 
urgently inform the public about the difference 
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ bail-in to reduce the 
sense of total loss associated with the term and 
thereby facilitate a rapid restructuring of the most 
distressed banks. 
                                                          
1 Gros argued several years ago that the Italian banking 
system was heading for a large NPL problem, as the 
productivity of investment in Italy had been too low for 
What value in non-performing 
loans? 
The key issue concerning non-performing loans in 
Italy is not how large they are, but how much they 
are worth. But the residual value of NPLs is 
particularly difficult to evaluate as the vast 
majority of the NPLs, especially the most doubtful 
ones, are towards corporate entities, not 
households. This is important since the recovery 
rates on commercial loans that go into default 
tend to be rather low. On paper there are enough 
guarantees and collateral to cover the remaining 
book value of all the NPS, but the collateral for 
commercial loans usually consists of machinery 
and commercial real estate (most often basic 
structures called ‘capannoni’). The machinery and 
industrial structures tend to have little value if the 
firm that used them no longer exists. The book 
value of the collateral and guarantees is thus a 
poor indicator of the actual value of NPLs. 
By contrast, recovery rates on household debt can 
be much higher if secured by real estate. However, 
the recovery process can take longer, as it is 
typically even more difficult for a bank to be able 
to close in on the primary residence. House prices 
have fallen in Italy by about 20% since the crisis – 
and can be expected to fall further by the time any 
authority can close in on today’s non-performing 
loans. But even so, the market value of real estate 
in private used (essentially apartments and 
houses) tends to be more stable than that of 
commercial structures, which might fall in value by 
much more than 20-30% when no longer used. 
Figure 1, taken from a study by the Banca d’Italia, 
shows that real estate prices have fallen and 
volumes had collapsed after the crisis. There is 
evidence now of a partial recovery in volumes, 
which should make it easier to evaluate the 
market value of real estate guarantees. 
 
long time. See “What is holding Italy back?”, VoxEU, 9 
November 2011 and “Quella bassa produttività del 
capitale in Italia”, Lavoce.info, 29 January 2013. 
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Figure 1. Property market in Italy 
 
 
Net present value 
Another factor that tends to reduce the market 
value of NPLs is that the main potential buyers of 
NPLs tend to apply rather substantial discount 
factors or risk premia. Differences in the time 
value of money can become crucial when, as is the 
case in Italy, one has to factor in five years for any 
recovery process. The importance of the discount 
factor is illustrated in the table below, taking the 
concrete example of an NPL whose expected 
recovery value is assumed to be 40 cents on the 
euro. If recovery takes five years, the present 
value would be around 31 cents with a risk 
premium of 5%, but only 20 cents with a risk 
premium of 15%, as is often applied by the hedge 
funds. Figure 2 shows that five years seems to be 
indeed the average time required for recovery.  
Figure 2. Recovery rates on liquidation procedures 
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More ‘patient’ longer-term investors would value 
NPLs at a higher price. However, patient investors 
such as life insurers and pension funds also tend 
to be very risk averse and are thus not likely to 
consider this type of investment. Moreover, NPLs 
constitute a very illiquid assets, which further 
reduces their attractiveness to many investors, 
thus driving up the risk premium. A high-risk 
premium naturally also reduces the present value 
of collateral, which usually can be foreclosed only 
after a long legal process. Even with a risk 
premium of 10%, the recovery value is halved 
after seven years. With a risk premium of 15% this 
happens already after five years. Any valuation of 
NPLs should thus discount the collateral strongly 
on this account, even apart from the doubts of its 
effective value mentioned above. 
Table 1. Present value of recovery of NPLs 
Assuming eventual recovery of 40 cents on the euro 
 Risk premium 
Years to 
recovery 
5% 10% 15% 20% 
0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
1 38.1 36.4 34.8 33.3 
2 36.3 33.1 30.2 27.8 
3 34.6 30.1 26.3 23.1 
4 32.9 27.3 22.9 19.3 
5 31.3 24.8 19.9 16.1 
6 29.8 22.6 17.3 13.4 
7 28.4 20.5 15.0 11.2 
8 27.1 18.7 13.1 9.3 
9 25.8 17.0 11.4 7.8 
10 24.6 15.4 9.9 6.5 
 
The role of the government 
In an ideal world, the government would 
recognise the costs of inefficient insolvency and 
recovery procedures. The Renzi government had 
earlier this year introduced a number of changes 
designed to accelerate the recovery process. But it 
                                                          
2 See Fabio Schiantarelli, Massimiliano Stacchini, Philip 
E. Strahan (2016), “Judicial efficiency and banks’ 
fragility: Evidence from Italy”, VoxEU, 13 August 2016. 
remains to be seen how effective this package will 
be (given also that many of these changes will 
mainly affect new loans). It is not the first time an 
Italian government has promised to accelerate 
judicial processes in Italy. But none of the previous 
reforms has had a noticeable impact.2 One can 
thus not count on a sudden acceleration of the 
judiciary apparatus to resolve the NPL problem. 
Making the most of the existing NPL will continue 
to require patience. The most patient investor 
could of course be the government. This is one 
reason why there might be a legitimate difference 
in the valuation of NPLs. The government can re-
finance itself at about 2% and does not need to 
worry about liquidity. In this sense, the 
government would naturally attach a higher value 
to NPLs than would a private investor. (This is 
apart from the fact that the supervisory 
authorities tend to condone the use of low-risk 
premia in the valuation models of the banks.)  
Recent research suggests that in the case of Italy 
both elements contribute about equally to the 
discrepancy between the book value and their 
market price (or rather the prices quoted on the 
few transactions which actually take place). This 
implies that the government could expect to break 
even if it took over the NPLs at a price somewhere 
half way between their book and their market 
values. But buying NPLs at a value above market 
price would of course constitute state aid. 
Who needs the ESM? 
Cleaning up the Italian banking system does not 
require resources from abroad, like the Single 
Resolution Fund (see box below) or loans from the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), given that 
Italian banks have few foreign creditors. The only 
question is how the economic losses embedded in 
the NPLs are distributed among Italian residents. 
With a bail-in, Italian investors lose; with a bail-
out, the Italian taxpayer carries the losses. The 
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domestic nature of the problem is also the reason 
why the current banking problems in Italy have 
little impact outside the country. The purpose of 
the ESM is to safeguard the stability of the euro-
area financial system. Any ESM loans would 
require first of all a visible threat to the stability of 
the system. But this is not apparent at present. 
Contribution from the Single Resolution Fund 
Although foreign support would in this case not 
strictly be necessary, part of the 
losses/recapitalisation could be eligible for financial 
support from the Single Resolution Fund. The 
contributions of the SRF are conditional and capped. 
At least 8% of the total liabilities plus own funds need 
to be bailed-in before the SRF can contribute up to 
5% of total liabilities to the resolution of the Italian 
banks. Using the total assets as of 31 December 2015 
as a proxy for total liabilities plus own funds, the SRF 
would be allowed to contribute a maximum of €23.3 
billion to the loss-absorption and recapitalisation. 
The funds that the SRF has collected and is allowed 
to use for the Italian banks during the transition are, 
however, insufficient to contribute this amount. 
Moreover, the Single Resolution Board that is 
responsible for the SRF has already indicated that it 
would like to use the fund only in exceptional 
circumstances and thus fully use the bail-in first 
(MREL). 
 
For more information, see W.P. de Groen and D. 
Gros (2015), “Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs 
of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to 
resolve a bank?”, In-Depth Analysis, prepared for the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 
European Parliament, Brussels, 20 November 2015. 
  
Whether or not a bail-in creates the danger of a 
general bank run and thus a danger to systemic 
stability in Italy is also the key issue under 
European regulations. At present, there is little 
indication of any systemic instability. One of the 
largest Italian banks is actually proceeding with a 
very large share issuance to increase its capital, 
which indicates that not all Italian banks have lost 
market access. 
Who is afraid of a bail-in? 
It depends of course of what kind of bail-in is being 
contemplated. But until now, the concept has 
been used without qualification, with many 
arguing that any bail-in would be destabilising. But 
this no longer necessarily seems to be the case. 
There are several reasons why a bail-in (de facto 
mostly of Italian investors) is not as harmful as 
often argued. First, a large part of the losses have 
already been anticipated, which limits the 
potential for negative spill-over effects on other 
banks or financial institutions within and outside 
Italy. The market values of shares and 
(subordinated) debt instruments of Italian banks 
with large portfolios of NPLs have already for quite 
some time remained well below the book values, 
and these lower valuations must by now have 
been reflected in the books (and the expectations) 
of the institutional investors. Even retail investors 
should by now have realised that they might to 
have to bear some losses. 
Second, a (soft) bail-in does not mean a total loss. 
Most of the bailed-in creditors will receive shares 
(at book value) in the resolved/restructured bank 
in return for their debt. These shares might 
initially quote well below the book value, but they 
will not be worthless. At present, major banks 
quote at between 30-50% of book. The immediate 
paper loss for creditors would thus be in this order 
of magnitude. Moreover the value of the ‘good 
banks’ that remain (without NPLs) is likely to 
recover along with the recovery of the economy, 
the cost-cutting and the ongoing slight increase in 
interest rates.  
Third, the government can manage the political 
problems by buying some of the retail instruments 
from poorer households, or those with excessive 
exposure, at close to par and then let itself be 
bailed in. This would result in a de facto 
nationalisation even under a ‘private solution’.  
The combination of these factors can explain the 
relative calm in the market, despite the fact that 
some form of bail-in – e.g. the conversion of 
subordinated debt in equity of Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (MPS) – is now clearly unavoidable.  
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Liberating banks of the NPL 
burden: The numbers 
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations show 
that most of the book losses that would arise from 
a transfer of the NPLs, for example to an asset 
management company, could be absorbed by a 
combination of existing excess capital and bail-in. 
The bail-in does not need to involve large losses as 
it would be a conversion of debt into equity. Only 
a small minority of the creditors would need to 
lose outright. 
We start by looking at the seven banks whose 
NPLs are larger than the capital (technically, a 
‘Texas ratio’ in excess of 1). Table A1 in the Annex 
shows that for four of these banks the likely losses 
(under our assumptions) are larger than the sum 
of provisions and capital, making a ‘hard’ bail-in 
inevitable, as no investor will be willing to invest in 
a bank whose book value becomes negative under 
any realistic valuation of its NPL book. However, 
the total amount of ‘hard’ bail would only be 
about €5 billion. This is equivalent to €100 per 
each Italian citizen and represents only a small 
fraction of the overall banking system or the 
overall wealth of Italian households. However, the 
losses are likely to be concentrated, given that the 
banks had convinced their own customers to 
concentrate their personal investments in these 
instruments. The political pressure that will be 
placed on the Government by 100,000 
bondholders, each of whom stand to lose €50,000 
on average, will thus be immense. The 50 million 
taxpayers will thus in the end agree to 
compensate the 100,000, but this a question of 
social equity, not of efficiency and there are no 
European rules that would hinder the Italian 
government from compensating those who have 
lost their lifetime savings. 
After receiving the €5 billion of ‘hard’ bail-in, the 
banks would need to be recapitalised. We assume 
that a capital ratio of 9-10% would then be 
sufficient, since what would remain are ‘good’ 
banks without any NPL risks on their balance 
                                                          
3 “Banche, gli errori fattie quelli da non fare”, Corriere 
della Sera, 13 December 2016.  
sheets. Our calculations show that about €19 
billion would be needed for recapitalisation. These 
funds could come in the form of either new equity 
or ‘soft’ bail-in. Given that the stronger banks 
(those that are not distressed) will also be on the 
market for bank capital, even good banks might 
struggle to find investors. It is thus likely that a 
large part of the €19 billion will have to take the 
form of ‘soft’ bail in. 
As recently pointed out by Francesco Giavazzi,3 
this bail-in would not imply a total loss. The ‘mark 
to market’ loss might be ‘only’ about 50 % if the 
good banks trade at one-half of their book value. 
At the level of the system the numbers would be 
larger. If all non-performing exposures of the 
largest 15 Italian banks are transferred to a bad 
bank (i.e. as an asset-relief measure) and if 40 
cents on the euro are recovered in five years’ time, 
the total loss would be about €219 billion 
(assuming a rate of return of 10%). But existing 
provisions and write-downs cover a large part of 
this, leaving €90 billion in new losses that would 
need to be absorbed. But Italian banks have 
substantial capital buffers, which would no longer 
be needed if all non-performing exposure has 
been taken off the balance sheet. 
Assuming that Italian banks with a clean balance 
sheet would need to hold only about 9% 
(minimum total capital requirement plus 1% 
buffer) regulatory capital, they can cover €61 
billion (of the €90 billion) with excess capital. This 
would leave only €28 billion of losses to be 
covered from other sources. Only €5 billion of 
hard bail-in would then be needed (only for the 
distressed banks), leaving about €23 billion of 
remaining losses to be covered from either soft 
bail-in or new capital. One bank, Unicredit, already 
intends to raise more than one-half of this sum 
through new capital. The other banks with NPL 
problems should find it possible to raise another 
€10 billion in capital through either new capital or 
some soft bail-in. 
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Conclusions 
The financial engineering needed to deal with 
existing NPL problem in Italy seems manageable, 
if politically difficult. Taking care of the NPLs in the 
distressed banks would require a combination of a 
modest amount (€5 billion) of ‘hard’ bail-in of 
some subordinated instruments, whose holders 
would lose everything. The remainder of the 
capital for the ‘cleaned-up’ good banks could be 
found through a combination of new capital and 
soft bail-in, under which bond holders would 
receive an equity stake. 
The underlying longer-term problem, however, 
would not be affected by any cleaning of the 
balance sheets. The underlying problem is the 
extremely low profitability of investments in Italy, 
which started a long time before this recession set 
in. It would be a delusion to think that the present 
NPL problem is only a consequence of the very 
long and deep recession Italy has faced. This 
recession did not come about for no particular 
reason. The recession has been so deep and 
protracted in Italy because its economy 
experienced a long run with a rather high rate of 
investment (higher than that of Germany until 
very recently) but growth had been sub-par for a 
long time4 (Gros (2014). The crisis and the ensuing 
recession laid bare the fact that a large part of this 
investment had been unproductive. 
                                                          
4 See D. Gros, “Investment as the key to recovery in the 
euro area?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 326, CEPS, Brussels, 
18 November 2014. 
The key long-term question for Italy is thus 
whether its banking system will merely continue 
in its old ways after the present NPLs have been 
taken off its balance sheets. If the incentive 
system underlying credit allocation does not 
change, investment will not become more 
productive and growth will remain weak. It would 
then be only a question of time before NPLs 
become again a problem. Fortunately, it appears 
that the new management that has been installed 
in one of the largest banks and nearly all of the 
other distressed banks will constitute a definite 
break with the past. 
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Table A1. Loss allocation among distressed Italian banks (€ billion) 
Bank 
Balance sheet 
(=Gross 
carrying 
amount) 
NPLs 
(nominal) 
Estimated 
Loss (= 75% of 
nominal) 
Allocation of losses Recapitalisation 
Provisions 
Total 
regulatory 
capital  
Creditors (hard-
bail-in) 
Creditors 
(soft-bail-in) 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena 
209 48 36.0 21.9 11.1 3.0 6.4 
Banca Carige 35 8 5.8 3.2 2.6  1.6 
Veneto Banca 37 8 6.2 2.9 2.7 0.6 1.9 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza 46 10 7.4 4.2 2.8 0.3 2.1 
Credito Valtellinese 35 6 4.2 2.0 2.3  1.3 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia 
Romagna  
82 12 9.1 5.3 5.0  1.5 
Banco Popolare 151 21 15.9 6.7 8.0 1.2 4.0 
Total distressed banks 595 112 84.5 46.3 34.5 5.1 18.8 
Total Italian banks 2,976 292 219.1 129.5 167.8 5.1 23.2 
Notes: Banks are considered distressed if the total gross non-performing exposures are larger than the capital plus non-performing exposure provisions. The gross carrying amount includes 
loans, debt securities and off-balance sheet exposures. The expected loss is based on 24.8% recovery. The recapitalisation required is calculated based on 9% of total (remaining) risk-
weighted assets. The total for the Italian banks covers all 15 Italian banks that have been subject to the EBA’s 2016 transparency exercise. Data as of 30 June 2016. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EBA (2016), www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-transparency-exercise/2016/results.  
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